

of *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* [Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1970], esp. 187–91, and “Second Thoughts on Paradigms,” in *Essential Tension*, 293–319).

3. Michael Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (New York: Pantheon, 1972).

4. For a very different account of Protagoras’ views on language (an account I believe has more in common with fourth-century thinkers than Protagoras), see Michel Nancy, “A qui la parole? Platon et Aristote face à Protagoras,” *Positions de la Sophistique*, ed. Barbara Cassin (Paris: Vrin, 1986), 75–90.

5. Protagoras’ notion of twofold *logoi* has been described as “the core of the adversary system of justice, legislative deliberations, and academic debate” (Harold Barrett, *The Sophists: Rhetoric, Democracy, and Plato’s Idea of Sophistry* [Novata, CA: Chandler and Sharp, 1987], 10–11).

6. For the argument that efforts to formulate self-conscious oratory date to the time of Homer, see Richard L. Enos, “Emerging Notions of Heuristic, Eristic, and Protreptic Rhetoric in Homeric Discourse: Proto-Literate Conniving, Wrangling, and Reasoning,” *Selected Papers from the 1981 Texas Writing Research Conference*, ed. Maxine C. Hairston and Cynthia L. Selve (Austin: U. of Texas Press, 1981), 44–64.

7. William M. A. Grimaldi, *Aristotle, Rhetoric: A Commentary*, Vol. 1 (New York: Fordham U. Press, 1980).

8. For a recent survey of the controversies over the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic in Aristotle, see Lawrence D. Green, “Aristotelian Rhetoric, Dialectic, and the Traditions of Ἀντίστροφος,” *Rhetorica* 8 (1990): 5–27.

9. Kennedy, *APG*, 67.

10. Susan C. Jarratt, “The First Sophists and the Uses of History,” *Rhetoric Review* 6 (1987): 67–77, and “The Role of the Sophists in Histories of Consciousness,” *PR* 23 (1990): 85–95.

11. Jarratt, “Role of the Sophists,” 89, citing Guthrie, *HGP III*, 55.

12. Jarratt, “Role of the Sophists,” 90.

13. *Ibid.*

14. *Ibid.*, 91, 93.

15. Contrast my analysis of Protagoras’ *logos* with that of Charles P. Segal, “Gorgias and the Psychology of the Logos,” *HSCP* 66 (1962): 99–155.

16. Felix Heinimann, *Nomos und Physis* (Basel: F. Reinhardt, 1945); Martin Ostwald, *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law: Law, Society, and Politics in Fifth-Century Athens* (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1986), esp. 199–333.

## AFTERWORD

It has been over a decade since publications by Thomas Cole (*The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece*) and myself challenged assumptions that informed traditional and revisionist accounts of “sophistic rhetoric.” Traditional accounts, largely based on Plato’s unflattering portrayals of fifth and fourth century BCE Sophists, had reduced the historical role of the so-called Older Sophists to the teaching of amoral and atheoretical rhetoric. Revisionist accounts differed by discipline. In philosophy, some sophistic texts were redeemed by the judgment that their content was legitimately philosophical after all. In communication studies and English, sophistic rhetoric has been heralded as a rival philosophy, practice, or pedagogy to that found in the texts of Plato and Aristotle. Though the texts of the Older Sophists may be polyvalent, they generally have not been treated as polysemous; that is, the primary difference between traditionalists and revisionists has not been about what the Older Sophists’ texts say, but how their doctrines and practices should be valued. Both traditionalists and revisionists have treated the concept of “sophistic rhetoric” as coherent and useful. It is fair to say that such assumptions are now open to question.

What changed in recent years, I believe, are our assumptions about how we should describe what the Older Sophists were doing. By far, the most animated discussions that the first edition of this book generated stemmed not from substantive claims made about Protagoras but from claims advanced in chapters 3 and 4 concerning the historical assumptions we bring to the study of the Sophists. Accordingly, in this afterword I return to those assumptions. First, I describe the role of theoretical presuppositions in classical historiography and describe what I call “rhetorical salience.” In the process, I briefly revisit the distinction

made in the first edition of this book between historical reconstruction and contemporary appropriation. Second, I revisit certain persistent questions involving Plato and the term *rhêtorikê*, and the historiographical status of “sophistic rhetoric.”

### RHETORICAL SALIENCE AND ROLE OF THEORY

What I have in mind by “theory” is simply a web of beliefs that helps us to understand and describe some aspect of the world. Some classicists have resisted the notion that their work is informed by theory because they treat theory as a dogmatic set of beliefs that predetermines the readings of texts with insufficient historical and critical nuance. Indeed, sometimes that happens. But *every* classicist approaches *every* text and fragment with a set of beliefs that inform their interpretations—how could we “read” otherwise? Such beliefs include psychological assumptions about how people think, linguistic assumptions about how people communicate, and technological assumptions about the available media through which people communicate. I can think of no good reason *not* to describe such a set of beliefs a “theory,” as long as we use the term loosely to describe any reasonably coherent set of beliefs that seeks to understand and explain some aspect of the world.

Eric Havelock’s work on what he described as the “literate revolution” in classical Greece has been alternately praised and maligned. For Cole and myself, Havelock’s influence was substantial as it led us to ask questions and read texts in a manner we otherwise would never have pursued. One example must suffice. First and foremost, Havelock encouraged me to look at what writers such as Gorgias or Protagoras were *doing*, not just what they were saying. While there is considerable disagreement about the precise cognitive implications of the growing literacy in classical Greece, there is little question that the fifth century BCE witnessed far-reaching changes in the *uses* of literacy. Compositional practices and modes of description and explanation changed radically between the time when Parmenides composed his account of Being in epic hexameters and when Aristotle wrote his *Metaphysics* in his distinctive prose. What makes a text like Gorgias’s *Helen* interesting to me is that Gorgias is practicing a relatively new form of investigation that is performed in a prose style like no other. To appreciate Gorgias’s historical significance requires us to appreciate his particularity, which is why

I tend to cringe when he is put in anachronistic categories, like “anti-essentialist.”

Although I have opinions on the relative merits of different assumptions about reading classical texts, at the moment I do not intend to argue that some theories are right and some are wrong. Rather, my point is that when we engage texts, we are looking for something, and what we are looking for—and what we *notice*—is guided by beliefs that can be called theoretical. These beliefs create what I call *rhetorical salience* for specific features of a text. For nineteenth-century pragmatists, for example, what was rhetorically salient about Protagoras was his explicit humanism, his religious agnosticism, and what I have described previously as his “objective relativism.” What was salient for me was how he took Heraclitean insights and advanced new modes of description that Moravcsik calls “second stage compositional explanations” (see chapters 5 and 6 of this book). As few and far between as Protagoras’s fragments are, there has never been a shortage of alternative readings, each guided by what the scholar finds salient.

That our readings are informed by our particular values and interests is hardly news, but it is my hope that the notion of rhetorical salience can help us better understand and make sense of competing interpretations. It may help us recognize that some readings rely on the salience of too little of a text (such as when Gorgias’s whole career is reduced to his use of the term *paignion*) and it may help distinguish the values and interests informing historical reconstructions and contemporary appropriations. My examples, I confess, are a bit self-serving, but they may prove useful.

For better or for worse, I learned early to expect a certain amount of zeal and vehemence from my critics. For years I thought no one could top the ad hominem assault that met my earliest work, but since that time I have been likened twice to those Holocaust revisionists typically pilloried for their callous anti-Semitism. Aside from the pain such a description evoked, what I find significant about these two readings of my work is that they came from opposite ends of the academic ideological continuum.

On one side comes Victor Vitanza, who defies and personally resists labeling but who, for the purposes of this narrative, can be summed up as a poststructuralist Vitanzian-Deleuzian. In his book *Negation, Subjectivity, and the History of Rhetoric*, Vitanza describes me as a traditional-modernist-philological-“metaphysical” formalist, as well as a part-time

Platonist and Aristotelian (32–34). Invoking Lyotard's notion of a *differend*, and his critique of the rules of evidence that characterize litigation, Vitanza compares my historical arguments for considering the construct "sophistic rhetoric" suspect to Holocaust revisionists who claim that no reliable evidence exists that the Holocaust happened. Because I question the genus "sophist," I commit a form of genocide ("Genus-cide") that seeks the *ex-termination* of "the sophists" ("Sophist-cide"): "Schiappa is engaging in a very violent and potentially dangerous and pernicious *differend*. Schiappa's thinking is much like the contemporary historians' thinking who would deny—given the rules of evidence in the courtroom—the less-than-factual testimony of the Holocaust survivors" (45).

Now, not surprising, I disagree with Vitanza's description of me and of my argument concerning sophistic rhetoric. My work, in this book and in *The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece*, has questioned the historical utility of the adjective "sophistic," especially when joined with the noun "rhetoric," but I have never said, as Vitanza claims, that the Sophists "never existed." Quite the contrary—my goal was to recover the historical contributions of Older Sophists like Gorgias and Protagoras. Following Kerferd, I have noted that many wise men were called "sophists" and the basic point of the work Vitanza engages can be summarized as the simple caution "do not overgeneralize." But this story does not end with Vitanza.

From a quite different perspective, Rainer Friedrich—classicist, Homer scholar, and critic of postmodernism—reacted passionately to a reviewer's description in the *Bryn Mawr Classical Review* of my account of how facts are socially constructed.<sup>1</sup> In the same article (subsequently included as a chapter in *Beginnings*) that Vitanza critiques, I use the example of the statement that "JFK was killed in 1963" as an example of a reliable fact that was nonetheless socially constructed and could, in theory, be revised someday as our conceptualizations of time, identity, and mortality evolve. I noted that rejecting the statement "JFK died in 1881" does not make me a "traditionalist, positivist, objectivist, foundationalist who labors under the delusion that I have access to objective and uninterpreted facts" (*Beginnings*, 60). Friedrich *likes* these labels and is appalled that I would distance myself from them: "Let me use an untrivial example. If I reject as false, on the strength of cogent evidence, the assertion that the Nazi genocide of the European Jewry in the early forties of the twentieth century did not happen, and am therefore branded as a 'traditionalist, positivist, objectivist, foundationalist who labors under the delusion that I have access to objective and uninterpreted facts'—

what would this branding of me amount to? It would amount to a subtle form of Holocaust denial, and it would place my detractors in the most odious company!" In other words, my commitment to social constructionism is sufficient for Friedrich to brand me as a dangerous postmodernist, and he dismisses my book, without having read it, based on a favorable review in *Bryn Mawr Classical Review* wherein my reviewer praised a "levelheaded approach that incorporates healthy portions of poststructuralist theory along with what we call rational interpretation."<sup>2</sup>

I find it fascinating that two scholars from such disparate theoretical starting points would be united in their efforts to portray my argumentative framework as one that facilitates Holocaust deniers, and it is perplexing that they would do so based on the same text. Yet this nicely illustrates rhetorical salience. At the risk of psychologizing, I think one can diagnose their readings as follows: Vitanza reads my concern with categories as symptomatic of an essentializing Aristotelian worldview. Combined with my professed fondness for well-evidenced historical reconstructions, my claim that the construct "sophistic rhetoric" is one that we can do without replicates a metaphysical and epistemological set of commitments that can, and has, been put to evil purposes to marginalize, harm, and kill innocent human beings. For Vitanza and other poststructuralist critics, the *salient* portions of my text are those that reveal, to them, my dark side commitments. My efforts to distance myself from such a stance are ignored or declared "greatly disingenuous."<sup>3</sup> In Friedrich's case, quite different features of my text are salient. Indeed, Friedrich accepts my efforts to carve out a space for a social constructionist historiography as genuine, but for him it is postmodern skepticism that leads to Holocaust denial. While Vitanza wants to protect feelings from the tyranny of facts (48), Friedrich believes that facts are the shield we need against the tyranny of hate.<sup>4</sup>

I can respect where each scholar is coming from, but still I wonder what has this got to do with me? I think it is fair for me to complain that both reacted more to what they believe my work leads to than what it says, and neither engages any of my arguments directly. My lament can be reduced to this hermeneutic: what to me is most salient about my text is not what seems to be salient to these critics. I suspect that when authors complain that they have been misread, typically it amounts to the complaint that what *they* thought was valuable about their work is being undervalued. For over a decade I have argued that it is valuable to create a theoretical space that describes history as a distinct and valuable social practice that need not entail positivism. Those, like Crafton, who

share such values and interests, experience a different text than those guided by other agendas.

Now, back to the Sophists. While I have the opportunity to respond to those who write about my work, they do not. But there seems to me to be an ethical obligation (described in *Beginnings*, 167–68) to ponder the question of what Gorgias or Protagoras might have thought was most salient about their texts in their own historical moments. As imperfect as any answer may be, *one* defensible research program (among many) is to ask what they and their contemporaries found valuable and interesting about their work. Historical reconstruction, as I understand it, is at least partially motivated by an effort to understand the historical Other. When that happens, what becomes salient is not so much those features of the text that are similar to our favorite contemporary pieties, but what seems most distant and strange. Thus, when we acknowledge all readings are guided by our values and interests (glossed as our theory), let us not leave out a consideration of ethical relationship to those whom we study (including each other).

Some scholars have argued that the distinction between historical reconstruction and contemporary appropriation cannot be maintained because both scholarly pursuits involve interpretation and translation, and both are activities guided by the values and interests of the scholar. I remain unpersuaded that from such premises it necessarily follows that a distinction cannot be made, and I think the concept of rhetorical salience helps to explain why.

A nonacademic analogy may be useful here. One might take a piece of medieval music and do an historical reconstruction; that is, use instruments either from medieval times or recreations as faithful to what they used then as possible. Is this the same thing as capturing the past as it “really” happened? Of course not. But there is a purpose here—a *social* purpose—that is clearly recognizable and that is quite different than a contemporary appropriation that puts the music to a disco beat and uses electric instruments. The latter might be more fun, but clearly the social purposes to which the music is being put are quite different than the historical reconstruction.

The analogy illustrates how the values and methods of the two activities are distinct. Recreationists (whether from the Civil War or medieval music) often worry about “authenticity” and the avoidance of anachronism. Someone putting medieval music to a modern dance beat is guided by other values. Both activities are human attempts to make music, situated in a given moment in history—both are limited by available socially

constructed knowledge of music and instrumentation—but it is not hard to see that they can be discussed intelligently as different activities, and that they are guided by different socially constructed norms.

The piece of medieval music is a “text” that can be put to a variety of purposes (just like the texts of the Sophists). A given performance or use of that text can be judged by whatever norms people decide to use; that is, what is *salient* about the text will vary according to one’s tastes, values, and interests. One might prefer a disco version because one can dance to it, or because it is more like one’s own favorite music. Or one might prefer the (always incomplete) effort to recreate the sound that people living in medieval times might have heard. The bottom line is that I do not see anything among the tenets of poststructuralism and social constructionism that precludes drawing social and rhetorical distinctions between historical reconstruction and contemporary appropriation. It is only if and when someone tries to explain the difference in grand metaphysical terms (such as those critiqued in Richard Rorty’s *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*) that charges of “positivism” or other problematic philosophical “isms” become relevant.

One last point on the distinction between historical reconstruction and contemporary appropriation should be made. On several occasions over the past decade, in debates over the Sophists and historiography, the question of whether we can escape our hermeneutic situation and “break the bonds of the present” (as historians imply we can) has arisen.<sup>5</sup> Not surprisingly, my answer to such a question is somewhat different than those of my critics. Obviously what I have in mind is something other than time travel and is better phrased by asking “can we learn something new and different than we already knew?” Scholars who value historical reconstruction suggest that we can. For example: Why might someone prefer a historical reconstruction of medieval music? One motivation might be the pleasure and insight gained by exposing oneself to something different. *We change* from such encounters. Encounters with beliefs, values, or aesthetics that are different from our own offer us an opportunity to become someone other than who we were five minutes ago. We do not go to museums of history only to laugh and jeer at how stupid those past cultures were since they are different from us, but hopefully to try to understand those past cultures and open ourselves to the possibilities they offer.

Difference can be measured in space or time. When we travel and encounter a current culture different than what is already familiar to us, we can resist that difference, or we can embrace it and see where it takes

us. This is why in my chapter on Isocrates in *The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece* I argue an analogy between different sorts of human relationships and how we approach historical texts. To me, if I am involved in the social practice of writing history, I feel an ethical obligation to treat the Other (text), such as those of Protagoras and Gorgias, as much as I can on its own terms and context. "As much as I can" and "to the extent possible" are important qualifications, since even the act of translating Greek to English imposes an interpretation. Is there a "pure" meaning of Protagoras and Gorgias's texts, some perfect interpretation that is what they "really meant"? Of course not. Can we ever totally know and understand another human being? No. But there is a vast gulf between rejecting or accepting "differences," thus between imposing your own description of an Other versus giving them an opportunity to supply the vocabulary for their description.<sup>6</sup> The fact that such an opportunity can never be perfect (since even the questions we ask limit the answers we seek), does not mean that there is no difference between scholarly projects that try to avoid anachronism and those that do not.

#### PLATO, RHËTORIKË, AND THE SOPHISTS

Cole and I independently surmised that the word *rhêtorikê* may have been coined by Plato. We were both coaxed to this conclusion, already widely noted in various Greek lexicons, partly by the conspicuous absence of the term in any texts of the fifth century BCE (and from most in the fourth century BCE). This includes texts where one could reasonably expect to find the term if it were in common usage, such as Aristophanes's parodies of newfangled terms, or in the discussion of verbal arts in chapter 8 of *Dissoi Logoi*, or in any of the extant texts and fragments of the Older Sophists. We named Plato as our chief suspect also because of his documented penchant for coining terms ending with "ikê"—especially for terms denoting verbal arts. Almost no one challenges the idea that Plato coined the term for dialectic, for example, despite the long history of dialectical interaction that predates him. Similarly, despite a long history of suasive speech, we think it likely, or at least plausible, that Plato coined the term *rhêtorikê*.

After an initial flurry of "no, he didn't," "yes, he might have" exchanges,<sup>7</sup> two persistent questions can be identified: First, Is Plato's *Gorgias* the earliest extant use of *rhêtorikê*? Second, does the dating of the term matter for our understanding of the Sophists?

With respect to Plato's *Gorgias*, it is possible that Alcidas's *Against the Sophists* predates *Gorgias*. I personally doubt this, given apparent references to Isocrates' middle work, but it is fair to say there is no scholarly consensus on the issue.<sup>8</sup> Plato's first use of the term in *Gorgias* remains a puzzlement. His use of the phrase *tên kaloumenên rhêtorikên* might signal a self-conscious or novel use of the term, but not necessarily. The weakest argument here, in my estimation, is the claim that Plato is faithfully representing late fifth century BCE terminology; this is a problematic argument to make in light of the anachronisms and linguistic novelties of *Gorgias*. Sir Kenneth Dover notes "Plato writes not as a scholar" but "from first to last as an advocate." "It would be wrong to imagine," Dover suggests, that Plato "necessarily observes the standards of veracity which we demand of a historian."<sup>9</sup> And, of course, many scholars have expressed considerable doubt as to whether Plato represents the historical positions of Socrates—let alone Socrates' vocabulary—with accuracy.

The last point I wish to make about this first question is that it does not much matter who coined the term. While it delights some and outrages others to think of Plato as the creator of a term for an art he apparently reviled, absent time travel we will never know with confidence who first introduced the term or why. The question we *can* productively engage is whether the introduction of the term can or should alter the way we understand the texts of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. Here we can consider the following equivalent to the social scientist's notion of the null hypothesis: Is it reasonable to believe that the introduction of the term *rhêtorikê* makes *no* difference? Put differently, should we *ignore* the philological data that *rhêtorikê* appears in no fifth century text? The question can be made more concrete with respect to an individual author's *corpus*: Should we ignore the fact that Isocrates, for example, never uses the term but uses others, including *philosophia*, to describe his educational program?

Despite Gerard Pendrick's elaborate plea<sup>10</sup> that we ignore all this and go back to our work as if Cole or I had never published anything, the philologists' love of language precludes a hasty acceptance of the null hypothesis. After all, if there is one belief that all of us in Classics, English, Communication Studies, and Philosophy share, surely it is that language matters. Words matter. Names matter.

In previous work I tried to outline psychological, semiotic, and rhetorical reasons for believing that the introduction of a term that designates a category as culturally significant as "art of the rhetor" alters

the linguistic and intellectual landscape in nontrivial ways (i.e., reasons to reject the null hypothesis), but clearly the matter cannot be settled *a priori*. It is only through the tedious work of *revisiting* fifth and fourth century BCE texts without the traditional philosophy versus rhetoric bifocals that we can produce a new historical account of the Sophists and the origins of rhetorical theory.

Such work has been forthcoming, though it is clear that one's disciplinary starting point can play a significant role in what gets talked about—that is, which features of the Sophists' texts are most salient. For those in English, the most salient features of the Sophists' texts often are those that resonate with ongoing pedagogical and theoretical concerns.<sup>11</sup> Steve Mailloux has persuaded me that there is a legitimately felt need in some quarters of the humanities for *some* notion of "sophistic rhetoric" as a counterweight to Platonic and Aristotelian models; so long as that is true, contemporary appropriations of the Sophists should continue. Scholars in Classics, Philosophy, and Communication Studies have generated quite different readings.<sup>12</sup> It is not surprising that accounts of the Sophists turn out so differently when crafted by scholars in different disciplines. Nor, in retrospect, should I be surprised that the needs, interests, and reactions of a multidisciplinary audience can be contradictory (no one from an English department has ever described me as a post-modernist, and no one from Classics has ever called me a traditionalist).

How is current scholarship on the Sophists different than it was in the 1980s? No single generalization will suffice, but there are at least two trends that one can safely identify. First, there is now less generalization about the Sophists as a group and more attention to the contributions of individual Sophists, especially Protagoras, Gorgias, and Isocrates. Second, there is greater reflexivity now concerning the types of claims advanced about the Sophists and rhetorical theory in the fifth century. Victor Vitanza's notion of a Third Sophistic—and my own label, "neosophistic rhetoric"—have, for the most part, supplanted the anachronistic and overbroad label of "sophistic rhetoric."

The most remarkable advancement has been Michael Gagarin's provocatively titled essay, "Did the Sophists Aim to Persuade?" in which he argues that the long-held belief that the primary activity of the Sophists was to teach rhetoric qua persuasion is mistaken.<sup>13</sup> Gagarin's description of the Older Sophists' educational efforts is consistent with the account provided in this book for Protagoras, and he has continued his account in his recent book, *Antiphon the Athenian*.

Clearly, we have come a long way from the days when all of the Sophists' teachings and writings were reduced to a mostly platonic notion of "rhetoric." It is my hope that this book has made a modest addition to the continuing effort to understand the Older Sophists' contributions, no matter what labels for those contributions are ultimately deemed most satisfactory.

## NOTES

1. See John Michael Crafton's review of *The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece* (*Bryn Mawr Classical Review* 2001.03.09), followed by Rainer Friedrich's response (2001.04.16) and my reply (2001.04.26), all of which is accessible online at: <http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/bmcr/>.

2. Ibid.

3. Victor Vitanza, *Negation, Subjectivity, and the History of Rhetoric* (Albany: State U. of New York Press, 1997), 46.

4. Facts and feelings need not be thought of as distinct; they can be thought of as inseparable as energy and matter. Deconstruct any "fact" and one finds *nothing but* feelings—impressions, emotions, beliefs, interests, and values. When such feelings coalesce and are shared linguistically, facts may be one socially constructed result.

5. See, for example, Scott Consigny, *Gorgias, Sophist and Artist* (Columbia: U. of South Carolina Press, 2001), 11. I have responded to Consigny's critiques in previous publications: Edward Schiappa, "Some of My Best Friends Are Neosophists: A Reply to Consigny," *Rhetoric Review* 14 (1996): 272–79; Schiappa, "Protagoras and the Language Game of History: A Response to Consigny," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 25 (1995): 220–23.

6. The same opportunity to become more than we already are is available when learning a foreign language. Many of us have had that interesting experience of dreaming in a new language. Boom! At that moment, we are no longer merely translating words that are different to those that are familiar. We have changed through our acceptance of the world that a previously "other" language offers.

7. Most of these exchanges are discussed in my *Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece* (New Haven: Yale U. Press, 1999), chap. 2.

8. See the entry on Alcidas in Appendix B of this book. For summaries of the relevant literature see Neil O'Sullivan, *Alcidas, Aristophanes, and the Beginnings of Greek Stylistic Theory* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1992) and J. V. Muir, *Alcidas: The Works and Fragments* (London: Bristol Classical Press, 2001).

9. Kenneth Dover, *Plato: Symposium* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1980), viii, 9.

10. Gerard J. Pendrick, "Plato and *Rhētorikē*," *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*, 141 (1998): 10–23.

11. See, for example, Consigny, *Gorgias*; Susan C. Jarratt, *Rereading the Sophists* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois U. Press, 1991); Bruce McComiskey, *Gorgias and the New Sophistic Rhetoric* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois U. Press, 2002).

12. See, for example, Michael Gagarin, *Antiphon the Athenian* (Austin: U. of Texas Press, 2002); John Poulakos, *Sophistical Rhetoric in Classical Greece* (Columbia: U. of South Carolina Press, 1995); Takis Poulakos, *Speaking for the Polis: Isocrates' Rhetorical Education* (Columbia: South Carolina U. Press, 1997); Yun Lee Too, *The Rhetoric of Identity in Isocrates* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1995); Robert Wardy, *The Birth of Rhetoric: Gorgias, Plato and Their Successors* (London: Routledge, 1996). I limit myself

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here to books, but obviously the point could be amplified by a systematic review of journal literature.

13. Michael Gagarin, "Did the Sophists Aim to Persuade?" *Rhetorica* 19 (2001): 275-91.

## APPENDIX A

### CHRONOLOGY OF PROTAGORAS' LIFE

The scant evidence concerning the basic details of Protagoras' life is collected in several widely available sources.<sup>1</sup> My purpose here is not to analyze the evidence, but to provide a brief summary for those not already familiar with the literature.<sup>2</sup> The following outline is based on the chronologies provided by J. S. Morrison and J. A. Davison.<sup>3</sup> All dates are approximations: the years indicated are outside parameters during which the event listed is likely to have occurred. Because Morrison and Davison differ, I have included both scholars' estimated dates. In general, I believe that Morrison's are more reliable.<sup>4</sup>

Event	Morrison	Davison	Age
Birth at Abdera	490/484	492/1	0
Pupil of Persian <i>magi</i>	—	480/79	11-13
Settles as Sophist in Athens	460/454	464/3	27-30
Expelled from Athens (?)	—	458/7	33-35
Expulsion decree revoked (?)	—	445/4	39-48
Leaves Athens for Thurii	444	444/3	40-49
Returns to Athens	433	433	51-59
(Dramatic date of <i>Protagoras</i> )			
Leaves Athens	430	—	54-63
(Decree of Dioppeithes?)			
[Death of Pericles]	[429]	[429]	[55-64]
Returns to Athens	422	422/1	62-71
<i>Asebeia</i> accusation (?)	421/415	421/20	63-72
and death			